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PROPER FUNCTION, RELIABILITY AND WARRANT

Jack C. Lyons
Valparaiso University
Warrant: The Current Debate and Warrant and Proper Function

constitute Alvin Plantinga's recent effort to refute contemporary
theories of warrant and to establish his own. 1 The assault against the
current theories in Warrant: The Current Debate is undertaken by
using bizarre counterexamples such as the Case of the Epistemicall y
Serendipitous Brain Lesion or of the Epistemically Inflexible Climbe l',
as well as forays into Alpha-Centaurian worlds which include
Cartesian demons turned Star Trek and middle-aged radioactive
invisible elephants. The majority of these creative counterexamples
are produced to show that the standard accounts of warrant fail
because they wither when confronted with abnormalities and mal
functioning cognitive faculties. While I am not in complete agree
ment with Plantinga's consequent theory in Warrant and Proper
Function, I do think that both his attack on the other theories of
warrant and his own formulation are very illuminating and might
pl'Ovide some useful insights into the nature of warrant. By discuss
ing what I take to be the shortcomings of his proper function the~)I'Y'
I hope to show the general direction in which we might find a fail'
initial approximation of warrant. The resulting theory wi 11 be large Iy
descriptive, rather than normative, but it is difficult to keep a strict
distinction between the two in these matters.
Plantinga's positive theory is laid out in Warrant and Proper
Function:

a belief has warrant for me only if (1) it has been
produced in me by cognitive faculties that are work
ing properly (functioning as they ought to, subject to
no cognitive dysfunction) in a cognitive environment
that is appropriate for my kinds of cognitive faculties,
Lyol1sis a selliol' philosophy major at Valparaiso UniVersity. A resident of Vnlparais(I,
Illdialla, Jw will be attending The University of AdzOllfl il1 tlte fall wit/I tlw illtel/Moll of
getti11g a Mctomte in philosophy.
1 Since they are still forthcoming, all citations will be of the form "WPF, lI.I,C,
p. 31," denoting chapter, section, subsection and pllge number of the manuscript
version.
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(2) the segment of the design plan governing the
production of the belief is aimed at the production of
true beliefs, and (3) there is a high statistical probabil
ity that a belief produced under those conditions will
be true (WPF, II, II, p. 58).
Although the above cited formulation of warrant states that I am
warranted "only if" (1), (2) and (3), I think that the rest of the book
makes it dear that he intends these criteria to benot only individually
necessary, but also jointly sufficient (or very nearly so) for warrant.
I do not think, however, that they are either individually neces
sary nor very near Iyjointl y sufficientfor warrant. Criterion (3) nearly
makes the first two seem superfluous, for as long as there is a high
probability that the belief-producing mechanism functioning under
a certain set of circumstances yields true beliefs, what difference
could it make whether they are in the right environment, or that they
are properly designed or properly functioning, or that they are
designed with the intention of producing true beliefs? Provided that
we grant (3), what need is there for us to struggle with (1) and (2)?
This, I think, is the question that must be addressed.
If we consider Plantinga's Case of the Epistemically Serendipi
tous Lesion, it seems that a minor alteration will show that proper
function does not contribute to warrant in the manner that he has
suggested. In this instance, a person has a brain lesion tha t makes hel'
believe all sorts of ridiculous things,and one of those beliefs is that
she has a brain lesion. Surely she does not know that she is suffering
from a brain lesion, even though it is true. Thus, she is not warranted
in believing it (WeD. IX, II, B, p. 256, ff.). This case is invoked to show
that a causal type of reliabilism (such that I am warranted in the belief
that s is F iff s's being F causes or sustains that belief) is false.*
However, we need only change this to the Case of the God-Given
Epistemically Serendipitous Lesion to show that pl'oper function is
also false. In this case, however, the brain lesion does not produce a
large number of beliefs; it only produces one, that the pel'son has a
brain lesion. Further, if we stipulate that God gives someone that
lesion so thatshe would truly believe that she has a brain lesion, then
.. Throughout this paper the term "iff" will be used to designate "if and only if"
in logical propositions. -ed.
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Plantinga must concede that she has knowledge, even though it is
clear to the rest of us that she does not. None of her other faculties are
disrupted by the lesion; it adds to her cognitive apparatus without
taking anything away. God. working in mysterious ways ashe does,
designs a brain lesion that will always produce this one true belief.
This is the purpose of the lesion, and God creates a faculty. rather
than a deformity.
Since this new lesion-sensing faculty was devised and implanted
by God, it is clear that (1) the belief in question is the result of a
properly functioning faculty in an appropriate environment (God
took environment into consideration when devising the leSion), (2)
the relevant segment of the design plan is aimed at true belief and (3)
the design is a good one (the belief it produces is always true). This
case fits perfectly with Plantinga's notion of warrant, yet surely this
person is not really warranted in believing that she has a brain
lesion.2 What relevant difference would it make if the lesion were
produced by God and not by some injury?
A similar example can be borrowed from an old episode of The
Twilight Zone. In this episode, a man tosses a coin and it lands on its
edge. For the rest of the day he is able to read people's minds. By the
end of the day it would seem as if he might have some warrant for the
beliefs produced by this new and amazing faculty. since he would
have the opportunity to check what he "hears" with other sources,
conferring with people he could trust, and so forth. An important
point to note, however, is that whether we decide that his beliefs are
warranted or not, we do so before discovering whether his new
faculty is a gift from God or the result of some freak accident.
We can modify this scenario a bit and suppose that God gives our
coin-tosser his mind-reading faculty. but that this faculty works
only once every six hours and 42 minutes. Two or three times a day
our friend hears a voice in his head which seems to be coming from
someone else's head and he believes that he is hearing someone
2 Even if the lesion also produces a vast number of ridiculously false beliefs (as
in Plantinga's original case), this counterexample should still hold, for Planting"
stipulates that only the relevant segment must be aimed at the production of true
beliefs. If the lesion's recipient ill/ers tha t she has a brain disorder because she notices
that she suddenly has a large number of ridiculous beliefs, then we are suddenly
dealing with a different cognitive means (inference rather than the lesion). For
Plantinga's theory to hold, she must be warranted prior to inference, since proper
function etc. is supposed to be sufficient for warrant.
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else's thoughts. However, the faculty works only for the duration of
a single thought. and he is not around anyone with whom he can
speak in order to test the verity of his new faculty. Once again, God
has designed a splendid, truth-yielding, cognitive faculty, even if it
is not always at the disposal of the subject>swill (Plantinga does not
claim that it must be); the faculty does exactly what God intended it
to do, in the environment for which God intended it.
Six hours and 42 minutes after tossing that fated coin, our
protagonist accidentally bumps into a scowling oldbiker and "hears"
his first thought: "Watch where you're going, you silly and brutish
oaf." But our friend certainly does not know that "silly and brutish
oaf" was the precise appellation that the biker had formulated in his
mind; surely he is not warranted inbelieving that. (In fact, given the
subject's past experience with scowling old bikers, he is probably
warranted in believing that "silly and brutish oaf" was not the
appellation used in this particular case).
As time progresses. our friend may learn that these voices come
to him exactly every six hours and 42 minutes, and he may sit down
and test this faculty with his wife or a friend, thereby learning that it
does in fact yield true beliefs. It would seem tha t at this point (and not
until this point) our protagonist may be warranted in his beliefs. But
if we stipulate that this faculty is the result of some freak accident and
not the work of God or evolution, then we are forced to choose
between our coin-tosser's warrant and Plantinga's theory, for
Plantinga would have to hold that the man's beliefs are not war
ranted, since proper function, etc. is a necessary condition for war
rant. Until our friend has somehow ascertained the reliability of his
new faculty, it would seem that he is not even nearly warranted.
Whether he is a fortunate recipient of a divine gift or a hapless
individual who just stepped into the Twilight Zone, the beliefs
produced by this brand-new faculty simply are not warranted.
Examples like this can be easily multiplied. We can imagine any
number of adventitious faculties that simply defy explanation. In
every case, I think. we will say that the recipient is not (at least not
immediately) warranted inbelieving wha t these faculties induce her
to believe, no matter where they have come from. The mere fact that
they are new and bizarre implies that they are not to be trusted prior
to investigation.
What I think these thought experiments show is not only that
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there is something wrong with proper function theory but also just
what is missing from simple reliabilism. What hinders warrant in
these cases, the God-Given Lesion and the Part-Time Mind Reader,
is that although the cognitive apparatus is completely reliable and
functioning in a proper environment, the cognizer has little or no
reason to believe that it is. Reliability is an extremely important
aspect of warrant, but not just any reliability will sulfice, it must be
reliability that is recognized as such btJ the cognizer.
This seems to invite immediate problems. but it need not. Reli
ability as I conceive it is an objective, external property of a cognitive
faculty or process. I think that Plantinga is right in thinking that an
externalist account of warrant is more promising than an internalist
one. I may be doing my very best to believe all and only propositions
that are true, but if I am suffering from some type of cognitive
malfunction I will not be warranted in many of these otherwise
responsibly formed beliefs. However, as my intended
counterexamples to proper function theory show, this alone is not
sufficient. The cognizer must also have some reason to believe
some assurance-that this faculty or process is, in fact, reliable.
Before I try to explain how this might be had, though, I should
like to set out a perfunctory explanation of what a faculty or a process
is, as this has caused some problems in the past. First of all, I would
like to lump them together under the title "cognitive means." (The
way in which I use this term should obviate any objections; for the
present purposes, the difference between a faculty and a process will
not be significant). A cognitive means is anything that will suffice as
a reasonable answer to the question, "How do you know that?" There
will be unreasonable answers like, "A little bird told me," but these
should be fairly easy to weed out without a great deal of controversy.
Reasonable answers would include such responses as, HI remember
it," or "I saw it," or "I multip lied the numerator and the denominator
of the second fraction by two and added the numerators of both
fractions," or "I read it in the newspaper." Perhaps we could even say,
"Every six hours and 42 minutes I have the ability to read minds for
the duration of a single thought, and I 'heard' you think that." Inany
case, the mere fact that we use the label "cognitive means" does not
entail that we automatically assume reliability.
Simply answering the above question will not always give us a
clear-cut delineation of cognitive means, but it is not obvious that a
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clear-cut delineation is always necessary. We can and should, how
ever, make more precise distinctions where there is a difference in
reliability between different species of the same generic means.
For example. we might initially want to view memory simpliciter
as a cognitive means, until we have some assurance of differences in
reliability between different kinds of memorial functions. I might
have some strange memorial disorder which prevents me from
remembering things that happen on Mondays. In this event, the rest
ofrny memorial cognitive means might be reliable, although when it
comes to things occurring on Mondays, I cannot be warranted in
believing that I remember them. By way of comparing reliability we
come to distinguish different cognitive means. Thus the distinctions
can and should vary from person to person, as far as concerns the
individual's assessment of her own equipment. All instances of
seeing are not the same for a person with poor night vision. For this
reasonitisneithernecessarynordesirablethatwealwaysmakethese
distinctions clear--cut. 3
Having touched on this, I think I can explain my conception of
warrant in slightly more concise terms:
5 is warranted in believing p iff (1) the cognitive
means (c) that produces or sustains 5's belief in pis
reliable, and (2) 5 has some proper assurance that c is
reliable.
As my objections to Plantinga are intended to show, mere reliability
(or as Plantinga calls it, "a high statistical probability that a belief
produced under those conditions will be true"), whether produced
by God or not, is not enough. The cognizer must also have what I call
proper assurance that the relevant cognitive means is reliable.
If proper assurance were merely warrant under a different name
3 Although perhaps not always clear-cut, the distinctions will have to be very
narrow when it comes to Gettier cases, my response to which will be to suggest Ulat
certain very particular cognitive means in very particular circumstances are not
reliable. I think I can do this because I have included within the designation
"cognitive means" both faculties and processes. In normal circumstances the
inferences made may be completely reliable, but in these rare situations they are not
Gustasvision is not reliable under certain lighting conditions); even though we may
be warranted in thinking that the inference is reliable, it might be the case that the
inference itself is not reliable and that it is therefore not warranted.
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it would be very difficult for us to know anything, for this would
yield an infinite regress. Instead, I mean to include something like a
particular, weaker form of justification which applies only to beliefs
concerning the reliability of cognitive means. This should become
more clear as I continue.
In the above examples, I indicated that the adventitious faculties
did not produce warrant but that they could and often would if the
agent were given enough time to test their reliability. How we
determine this reliability can be seen by observing how we do this
with the faculties we already possess, how we come to some feeling
of assurance concerning our normal faculties. This seems to be
accomplished through coherence.
The type of coherence I have in mind here is very similar to that
which David Burne invokes to explain the origin of our ideas of an
external reality. Burne's theory is that we come to believe in the
endurance of objects beyond our immediate perception, because to
do otherwise would fly in the face of our experience. Whenwe sit and
watch objects, we conSistently find thatthey do not simply disappear
and reappear.
[My] observations are contrary, unless I suppose that
the door still remains, and that it was open'd without
my perceiving it: And this supposition, which was at
first entirely arbitl'my and hypothetical, acquires a
new fOl'ce and evidence by its being the only one,
upon which I can reconcile these contradictions
(Hurne, p. 196-7).
I think that Hume is right in believing that the only evidence we can
find for the reliability of our senses is some degl'ee of coherence. 4 We
cannot directly perceive objects without the interposition of our
faculties, and so we cannot simply compare the sense impressions to
the things themselves.
A foundationalist might want to claim that the evidence of our
4 I do not want to draw Hume as <1 coherentist, although I think that his
contribution here to coherentism is often neglected. Hume certainly does not think
that this argument entailed a proof that we have sensory knowledge (in his senses
of the terms, "proof" and "know ledge"). He does, however, seem to think tha t this
comprises a justification in some broadly deontological sense.
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senses is properly basic, but I hardly think any philosopher would
believe that the cognitive productions of my intermittent mind
reading capacity are. We must be skeptics here, in regards to these
supposed adventitious faculties, and if skepticism is to be taken
seriously, the only reasonable resolution I can conceive is some fonn
of coherence.
This will not be an unmitigated and egalitarian coherentism.
There will be certain beliefs that must enter into the equation, beliefs
about simple necessary truths and about our experience, a "founda
tion," if you will. 5 Ourpsychological/ epistemic goal here is to reduce
incoherence, at least enough so that it does not bother us. To contra
dict the facts that a thing cannot be red and green all over at the same
time or that I am currently appeared to redly cannot ease any of the
tension between my beliefs. for these beliefs cannot and should no t
be gotten rid of. At every tum, necessary truths and truths of
appearances will force themselves upon us.
Therefore, my idea of proper assurance can be stated as follows:
5 has proper assurance of the reliability of c iff: 5 is
warranted bysome other, previously established cog
nitive means (c,,) in believing that cis reliable, or (1) 5' s
assessment of c takes into account the purported
testimony of c, (2) 5's belief in the reliability of c does
not contradict any obvious necessary truths or truths
of appearances for 5 and (3) 5's experience with
regard to c has been fairly regular and coherent and
fits with the informationgiven5by his other faculties.
The first conjunct above implies only that 5 need not rely upon
personal experience to test the reliability of the cognitive means in
question. Provided that 5 is warranted in, say, believing a doctor's
testimonythathis(S's)hearingisworkingperfectlywell,hewillthen
have proper assurance of the reliability of his hearing (if he did no t
already). It is also important to note that this is only one possible way
5 This is to protect us from cases like Plantinga's Epistemically Inflexible
Climber, who suffers from a cognitive malfunction that inhibits the production of
new beliefs such that he still (coherently) believes tha twhich was true several hours
ago but is now false. If we did not hold that belief in appearances was mandatory.
our cognitive agent could simply devise coherent but ridiculous belief systems out
of sheer perversity or a misguided effort to relieve the tension of incoherence.
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of achieving proper assurance; if it were the only way, proper
assurance would lie forever beyond our grasp.
Implicit in this definition of proper assurance is the notion that S
is aware of the cognitive means that produces or the sustains a
particular belief. Therefore, victims of the machinations of some
Cartesian demon (or Plantingan Alpha-Centaurian) would not be
warranted in the beliefs thus produced, for typically we would think
that these people do not know that their beliefs are being produced
in this manner. These people cannot assess the reliability of this
particular cognitive means (the demon or Alpha-Centaurian), for
they are not even aware of its existence.
I feel that my description of proper assurance captures the way
in which we do assess our faculties. I use the term "assurance" in
order to imply that this is internal. Thus, my theory is a combination
of internalism (proper assurance) and externalism (reliability). Just
as Plantinga causes a great deal of problems for intemalism by
providing cases in which a person is doing everything right but
whose cognitive faculties are malfunctioning, so too, I think, have I
made things more difficult for the pure externalist by suggesting
adventitious but veridical faculties. Pure internalism seems better
suited for epistemic obligations than for knowledge, while pure
externalism seems better suited for consistently true beliefs than for
know ledge. I hope that this theory can enj oy the better aspects of each
of the other two.
There are several consequences of this theory, and I would like to
take note of a few of them. First of all, in the case of the God-Given
Brain Lesion, its recipient could never be warranted in the belief that
this lesion produces. The lesion functions as a perfectly reliable
faculty, but since it only produces a single belief there is nothing else
with which that true belief can cohere. It is difficult to see how she
could ever gain any assurance of reliability. Also,she could not
possibly fulfill my criteria as she has no idea why she has the beliefs
she has. She cannot answer the question, "how do you know that?".6
With the Part-Time Mind Reader we will see a very different
case. In this instance our protagonist will not at first be warranted in
6 As I mentioned in footnote 2, above, the beJiefthat one has a brain lesion couid
also be produced by other means, means that are warranted. If the victim's doctor
tells her that she has this lesion, she could, of course. be warranted in that belief, but
the lesion alone still does not produce warranted belief.
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beliefs produced by these new and untested cognitive means. How- .
ever, with time and experience, he might come to have warrant if he
can recognize (through introspection perhaps) the workings of dis
crete faculties and can achieve some assurance of the reliability of
these faculties through the type of coherence mentioned above. Our
Part-Time Mind Reader can subject himself to experiments, relying
a great deal on the testimony of others ("You're right! That is exactly
what I was thinking!"), or the coherence of his readings with other
facts, perhaps one day achieving warrant.
A consequence ofthis theory is that babies and Adam (if we could
bring him into the world fully rational but without any experience,
as God and the Early Moderns are wont to do) would not be
warranted in believing anything, except perhaps truths of appear
ances and some obvious (to them) necessary truths. Experience is
necessary for warrant, since it is needed to provide assurance of the
reliability of our cognitive means. But this seems to work for the
present theory rather than against it. Babies probably do not know
anything; even small children, sometimes, close their eyes in the
hope that something frightening will therefore go away, seemingly
not fully aware yet of the endurance of external objects. It seems
plausible that Adam would be like an infant (as far as knowledge is
concerned) who, lacking only the requisite experience, would grow
up very quickly in this respect.
Obviously more work will have to be done to thoroughly flesh
this theory out. 1have tried to give a rudimentary approximation of
warrant and to show why it might be initially plausible. It seems that
this theory, in combining reliabilism with elements of coherentism
and foundationalism, as well as externalism and internalism, might
avoid some of the pitfalls of its component theories ..
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